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1   ABSTRACT  
 
The degree to which firms are able to align the individual interests of their members 
with overall strategic objectives has been long recognized as a fundamental 
determinant of firm performance (e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976; Jensen (1986)). 
Much of our attention has focused on the role of extrinsic motivation based on rewards 
and sanctions to achieve such interest alignment. Recently, Gottschalg and Zollo (2004) 
have proposed a more comprehensive conceptual framework of interest alignment that 
considers not only extrinsic, but also enjoyment-based hedonic intrinsic and obligation-
based normative intrinsic motivational mechanisms. This study derives testable 
hypotheses from their framework and thus provides an empirical test of interest 
alignment theory based on a sample of 69 management buyouts in the UK.  The results 
of the multivariate regression model suggest that in this setting, interest alignment does 
have a significant influence on firm performance. Surprisingly, however, the 
performance impact of intrinsic motivation (particularly of a hedonic nature) is much 
more powerful than that of extrinsic motivation, which fails to show any statistical 
significance.  Furthermore, and contrary to “received wisdom”, the three types of 
motivation mutually reinforce each other in their positive impact on performance.  
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  21   Introduction 
 
Firm performance depends to a large extent on the degree to which the members 
of the organization work towards the accomplishment of organizational goals.  As 
seminal contributions in agency theory have pointed out, the interests of individuals in 
an organization are not always aligned with those of the organization as a whole (Jensen 
and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986); Alchian and Demsetz (1972)).  This may drive 
employees to behave in ways that impede firm performance.  The performance impact 
of organizational interest alignment, defined as the degree to which the members of the 
organization are motivated to behave in line with organizational goals (Gottschalg and 
Zollo (2004)), has been emphasized by several recent contributions to the management 
literature (Makadok (2003); Coff (1997); Coff (1999); Castanias and Helfat (1991)).  
Accordingly, firm performance can be seen as dependent on two elements.  A firm's 
market position (Porter (1979); Porter (1980; Porter (1985)) and resource configuration 
(Barney (1986); Barney (1991); Penrose (1959); Peteraf (1993); Wernerfelt (1984)) 
determine its potential performance, whereas the extent to which firms actually realize 
their performance potential crucially depends on the aggregate motivation of 
employees.  In other words, organizational interest alignment moderates the potential 
performance that is based on market positions, assets and capabilities (Figure 1). 
The question then arises: through which motivational mechanisms are firms able 
to achieve interest alignment and thereby enhance firm performance?  Most existing 
approaches to this question have their theoretical foundations in agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling (1976);  Jensen  (1986);  Alchian and Demsetz (1972)). This stream of 
research focuses on how reward systems and control mechanisms can ensure the 
alignment of individual interests with organizational goals. It makes the (implicit) 
assumption that human action is driven by extrinsic motivation, i.e. the desire to obtain 
additional work rewards from the external environment (Brief and Aldag (1977)). Firm 
performance is then enhanced based on reward systems that lead to a higher marginal 
cost of shirking and to higher monetary benefits from engaging in performance-
enhancing behavior (Frey and Jegen (2001)).  Research in social psychology and 
organizational behavior, however, points to the importance of different motivational 
mechanisms to trigger performance-enhancing behavior. In fact, a vast stream of 
research initiated by Deci and Ryan (1975) and Lepper and Greene (1976) 
demonstrated in experimental settings the influence of intrinsic motivation, i.e. the 
1   pleasure and satisfaction derived from an activity (Deci  (1975)), on performance. 
Substantial controversy remains even within the field regarding whether, and under 
what circumstances, the introduction of reward-based extrinsic motivation reduces 
intrinsic motivation to the point that performance suffers (e.g. Deci and Koestner 
(1999); Deci and Koestner (1999); Eisenberger and Cameron (1996); Eisenberger and 
Cameron (1998) ; Eisenberger and Cameron (1999)).  Recently, this debate seems to 
have moved towards the insight that the relationship between extrinsic motivation and 
performance is contingent upon the characteristics of the rewards (Deci and Ryan 
(1985)), the nature of the task (Prendergast (1999); Steers and Mowday (1977)) and 
individual preferences (Gottschalg and Zollo (2004)).  What this research clearly 
indicates, however, is the need to explicitly consider different types of motivation to 
understand the ways through which organizations align individual interests with firm 
goals.  
This study builds on a theoretical model of motivational mechanisms at the 
organizational level proposed by Gottschalg and Zollo (2004). This model departs from 
previous approaches to study interest alignment in the following ways.  First, it builds 
on recent advances in motivation theory (Lindenberg (2001)) in which the traditional 
intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy (Deci (1975; Deci (1976); Brief and Aldag (1977)) has 
been refined through the distinction between (obligation-based) “normative” intrinsic 
motivation and (enjoyment-based) “hedonic” intrinsic motivation.  The corresponding 
three-dimensional conceptualization of motivational mechanisms captures the essential 
distinction between a task-oriented and a social component of intrinsic motivation, 
while remains sufficiently parsimonious for its application in a business context. 
Second, it develops its arguments at the organizational level of analysis, which 
corresponds to the goal of understanding the impact of rewards on firm, rather than 
individual, performance.  Third, it explicitly states antecedents, interaction effects and 
consequences of all three dimensions of interest alignment.  
It is the objective of this study to see whether or not some of the theoretical 
arguments made by Gottschalg and Zollo (2004) are supported by empirical evidence. 
To this end, we derive a set of testable hypotheses regarding the impact of different 
components of interest alignment on firm performance from their model and test them 
empirically using a sample of 69 recent management buyouts in the UK. Buyouts 
provide an ideal setting for studying the performance impact of interest alignment, as 
they drastically change important antecedents of all three components of interest 
2 alignment (Jensen (1989); Cotter and Peck (2001); Smith (1990); Berg and Gottschalg 
(2005)) while leaving much of the determinants of potential firm performance (see 
Figure 1) unchanged. In a sense, the buyout constitutes an exogenous “shock” to the 
organization that allows us to obverse the performance implications of changes in 
organizational interest alignment and to compare the relative strength of its extrinsic, 
hedonic intrinsic and normative intrinsic components. 
The empirical analysis reveals a number of interesting results.  First, our data 
supports the view that overall interest alignment does play a significant role in 
determining firm performance. Second, among all three components of interest 
alignment, only hedonic intrinsic motivation has a significant (positive) influence on 
performance, while extrinsic motivation does not seem to have any significant 
influence. Third, and contrary to “received wisdom”, the three types of motivation 
mutually reinforce each other in their positive impact on performance.  
 
2   The Performance Impact of Organizational Interest Alignment 
 
Motivation has been identified as an important determinant of individual task 
performance, as it influences to what extent individuals reach their potential 
performance (e.g. Schuler and MacMillan (1984)).  In a very similar fashion, firm 
performance is also a function of how well the individuals who work for the 
organization are motivated to accomplish organizational goals (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); Jensen (1986); Alchian and Demsetz (1972)). If one conceptualizes a firm’s 
potential performance as determined by the combined use of its assets, capabilities and 
market positioning, the translation of potential into actual performance crucially 
depends on individuals’ willingness to utilize their skills and the available assets to 
compete in the most effective way (Castanias and Helfat (1991);  Schuler and 
MacMillan  (1984);  Schuler and Jackson (1987)).  Following Gottschalg and Zollo 
(2004), we thus model actual organizational performance as a function of both potential 
organizational performance and the aggregate level of motivation to behave in ways 
conducive to the realization of that potential. Organizational interest alignment, as a 
measure of the aggregate correspondence between individual and organizational goals, 
can therefore be defined as “the degree to which the members of an organization are 
motivated to behave in line with organizational goals” (Gottschalg and Zollo 2004:7).  
It is important to note that this definition of interest alignment does not impose 
3 restrictions as to how the members of the organization are being motivated, thereby 
enabling the consideration of different motivational mechanisms.
1 At the same time, this 
definition directly implies a positive impact of high levels of organizational interest 
alignment on performance.  It is interesting, however, to take a closer look at the 
different motivational processes that contribute to the creation of interest alignment.  
 
As proposed by Gottschalg and Zollo (2004), organizational interest alignment 
is the result of three (interrelated) motivational mechanisms: Extrinsic motivation is 
driven by the goal of obtaining additional resources (Lindenberg (2001)) that come in 
the form of extrinsic work rewards or outcomes (Brief and Aldag (1977)) such as 
money, power, recognition etc.  It can be formally defined as the degree to which 
behavior is influenced by tangible and intangible rewards obtained from the 
environment.  The impact of extrinsic motivation depends jointly on the reward system 
in place, which determines the extrinsic work rewards that the individual obtains as a 
function of any given behavior, and on the importance of these rewards to the 
individual.  Hedonic intrinsic motivation is driven by the goal of being engaged in 
enjoyable (Lindenberg (2001)), self-determined and competence-enhancing (Deci and 
Ryan (1985)) behavior. It is influenced by the perceived characteristics of the task and 
the task context (Hackman, Oldham et al. (1975);  Hackman and Oldham (1976); 
Hackman and Gersick (1990)).  The impact of hedonic intrinsic motivation depends on 
the importance the individual attributes to being engaged in enjoyable, self-determined 
and competence-enhancing behavior (King, Hautaluoma et al. (1983)).  It can be 
defined as the degree to which behavior is to driven by job satisfaction. Normative 
intrinsic motivation is driven by the goal of engaging in behavior that is compliant with 
organizational norms and values.  Individuals are thus normatively intrinsically 
motivated to engage in a given behavior, to the extent that this behavior is congruent 
with organizational norms and values (Allen and Meyer (1990); Kreps (1997)).  The 
intensity of normative intrinsic motivation hence depends on the degree to which 
individuals identify themselves with organizational norms and values.  More formally, 
normative intrinsic motivation can be defined as the degree to which behavior is 
influenced by the norms and values of the firm (for an overview on the drivers of 
motivation see Table 1). 
                                                 
1 In this respect organizational interest alignment differs from the related concept of the “governance 
4  
Most previous work on motivation has been done on the individual level of 
analysis. It is, as yet, uncertain how individual motivation aggregates to the 
organizational level.  Existing work on governance examining one, i.e. the extrinsic, 
aspect of interest alignment implicitly assumes that individual motivation can simply be 
aggregated to the organizational level.  Lacking a theory of how motivational levels 
aggregate, we must expect a priori that motivation operates similarly at the individual 
and organizational levels.  If this is true, we expect overall interest alignment to be 
driven by three different underlying motivational mechanisms: extrinsic, hedonic and 
normative interest alignment. Extrinsic interest alignment is the degree to which 
individual interests are aligned with organizational goals based on extrinsic motivation, 
hedonic interest alignment is the degree to which individual interests are aligned with 
organizational goals based on hedonic intrinsic motivation, and normative interest 
alignment is the degree to which individual interests are aligned with organizational 
goals based on normative intrinsic motivation.  
As interest alignment in general is positively related to firm performance, each 
of its components has to be expected to also have a direct and positive impact on firm 
performance.  Whenever extrinsic, normative intrinsic or hedonic intrinsic factors are at 
play to increase individual motivation, both the corresponding component of interest 
alignment at the collective level and, ultimately, firm performance are increased.  This 
effect can be formally stated in the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: The greater the level of extrinsic interest alignment in a given organization, the 
higher the performance of the firm. 
 
H2: The greater the level of normative interest alignment in a given organization, the 
higher the performance of the firm. 
 
H3: The greater the level of hedonic interest alignment in a given organization, the 
higher the performance of the firm. 
 
In addition to testing whether the hypothesized positive impact of the three 
components of interest alignment is supported by empirical evidence, it is also 
interesting to compare them in their relative strength.  In the following, we will 
                                                                                                                                               
problem”, with its implicit focus on agency theory arguments and thus extrinsic motivation. 
5 empirically test our hypotheses regarding the influence of different components of 
interest alignment on firm performance. 
 
3   Research Design 
 
3.1 Research Setting 
Our hypotheses are tested in the context of leveraged management buyouts in 
the UK.  This was an ideal setting as it fulfilled certain key criteria.  First, it allowed us 
to observe changes in the strength of interest alignment.  Second, we could measure the 
performance impact of these changes.  And third, we could isolate the performance 
impact of interest alignment from other factors that may alter firm performance.  
A buyout dramatically changes several of the antecedents of interest alignment 
identified by Gottschalg & Zollo (2004). Extrinsic interest alignment, for example, 
changes through the introduction of pay-for-performance remuneration schemes or 
equity plans for top management and employees (Fox and Marcus (1992);  Anders 
(1992)). Detailed interviews with 23 top executives involved in the management of 
(successful and less successful) buyouts revealed that buyouts also have a substantial 
impact on intrinsic forms of motivation.  Managers described important changes in the 
way employees perceive their job after the buyout, which influence hedonic intrinsic 
motivation. At the same time they emphasized the effect a buyout can have on the social 
community of the firm, and hence on normative intrinsic motivation.  
It should also be noted that the performance of a buyout can be assessed with a 
(relatively) high degree of accuracy and objectivity: unlike other acquisitions, buyout 
companies remain independent legal entities and the return on equity (annualized 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to the equity investors has been widely used by 
researchers and practitioners as an objective performance measure for buyouts 
(Gottschalg, Loos et al. (2004), Gottschalg, Phalippou et al. (2004)).   
Finally, buyouts are stand-alone acquisitions that tend to leave the resource 
configuration of the acquired company relatively unchanged (Baker and Montgomery 
(1994)), especially when compared to events that lead to comparable changes in the 
antecedents of interest alignment (like a merger or major acquisition).  This is not to 
deny the substantial level of change that a buyout can trigger in the acquired company.  
However, if we apply the distinction between factors that determine potential 
performance and those that determine the ability to realize this potential (Figure 1), a 
6 large amount of overall value generation through the buyout can be attributed to the 
latter (Berg and Gottschalg (2005)). As we also control for many of the factors that 
change potential performance in our model, we are able to sufficiently isolate the 
performance impact of changes in interest alignment. 
  
3.2 Sample and Data Collection 
The research design involved three phases.  In the first phase, detailed interviews 
were conducted with 23 senior executives involved in European buyouts, either as 
managers of buyout portfolio companies or as investment managers working for private 
equity firms.  Based on these interviews, a questionnaire-based survey was developed 
and fine-tuned to ensure measurability and clarity.  Recipients of the survey were 
identified using the buyout database of the Centre for Management Buyout Research 
(CMBOR) at the University of Nottingham, the most comprehensive source of 
information on buyouts in the UK.  Management buy-ins were excluded from our 
analysis, as the change in the top management team they imply is likely to have a 
particular impact on interest alignment that we wanted to exclude from our analysis.  In 
the second phase, a survey was conducted on the 2,415 buyouts that took place between 
1996 and 1999 in the UK, or were exited between 2000 and 2002.  These criteria were 
chosen as reliable performance (IRR) information could be obtained, either in the form 
of realized returns (in case of buyouts already sold) or marked-to-market book returns a 
sufficient interval (at least three years).  The final phase of the research design involved 
augmenting the dataset with secondary data on relevant characteristics of the acquired 
company and comparable stock market returns over the investment horizon for each 
deal. 
The survey consisted of four main parts. The first and third parts asked the 
responding top executive of the buyout company to assess the motivation levels of his 
or her top management team prior to and following the buyout.  Extrinsic, hedonic and 
normative interest alignment were measured through a total of eight questions using an 
instrument developed by Theresa Amabile and colleagues (Amabile, Tighe et al. (1994)) 
that was adjusted to the buyout setting.  The second part of the survey gathered 
information about the characteristics of the buyout such as the year of entry and exit, the 
industry segment of the acquired company, the initial financial leverage and events that 
could have an influence on the potential performance on the buyout company 
(restructuring, layoffs, follow-on acquisitions of divestitures etc.). The fourth part of the 
7 survey assessed buyout performance through multiple objective and subjective 
performance measures. 
Of the total 2,415 companies to which the survey was sent in July 2003, 303 
were removed from our list as they could not be contacted and 244 indicated that no one 
from the management team in place during the time of the buyout was still with the 
company.  Two follow-up letters at fortnightly intervals were sent to the remaining 
1,868 companies.  With 89 companies responding before October 2003, the response 
rate was 5%.  In early 2004, we made a second effort to collect data from a sub-sample 
of the remaining 1,779 firms.  Of these, we had access to additional information for 334 
via research contacts with institutional investors in buyout funds.  We focused our 
efforts on these 334 firms, as the link between the qualitative information collected 
through the survey and the quantitative (performance) information available through the 
research contacts was particularly valuable.  Each of these companies received several 
follow-up calls: 31 could not be reached by mail or phone, and 51 reported that no one 
from the buyout management team was still with the company.  These were thus 
removed from our target list.  Of the remaining 257, 29 returned our survey, which 
corresponds to a response rate of 11% for the second data collection and increased the 
overall response rate to 6.3%.  This response has to be interpreted in light of the 
inevitable complexity of a survey that aims at capturing complex motivational processes 
at the organizational level.  Equally, we need to consider the tendency in the private 
equity domain not to disclose any information on individual transactions.  For this 
reason, survey response rates in the buyout area tend to be lower than for publicly 
traded companies.  
The survey was sent to the most knowledgeable respondent, who was identified 
by the CMBOR buyout database.  Most of the respondents were either Chief Executives 
(68%) or Managing Directors (19%), the remaining respondents held other top 
management functions.  Respondents were motivated to complete the questionnaire by 
the opportunity to compare their own buyout experience with those of other firms, as 
well as by assurances that their individual responses would be kept strictly confidential.   
Out of the 118 responding companies, we were able to obtain an objective IRR 
performance measure for 69 companies, either directly from the respondent through the 
survey (21 cases), or based on proprietary information the author was able to obtain 
8 from institutional investors in buyout funds (48 cases)
2. To assess the impact of a 
possible non-response bias, a number of sample mean comparison tests were made.  
First, the general characteristics of the responding companies in our sample were 
compared to all 2,415 buyouts from the CMBOR database initially identified for this 
study.  Two-tailed t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square tests for categorical 
variables indicated that there were no significant differences between the two samples in 
terms of size (equity invested), deal source (privatization, secondary buyout, public-to-
private deal etc.), comparable public market returns, the distribution of deals across 10 
industry categories or the percentage of deals that were already exited.  However, the 
average holding period of the deals in our sample was significantly longer (5.5 vs. 5.2 
years) than the average buyout in the CMBOR database.  Also, the entry years 1997 and 
1999 were significantly over-represented in our response sample.  In a second step, the 
performance (IRR) of the 69 deals in our sample was compared with a set of UK 
buyouts composed of deals on which our research partners from the community of 
investors in buyout funds were able to provide us with performance information.  The 
performance of the buyouts in our sample does not statistically differ from either the 
overall set of 402 UK buyout deals or the 190 UK buyout deals that were entered during 
the same time period as our survey responses. 
 
3.3 Measurement and Model Specification  
Dependent Variable. We operationalize firm performance as the annualized 
gross return on equity (IRR).  
Explanatory Variables. Changes in Interest Alignment have been measured 
based on survey responses that capture motivational levels prior to and following the 
buyout.  Given the novelty of the theoretical distinction between hedonic and normative 
types of intrinsic motivation, and the limited amount of prior research on 
organizational-level motivation, existing instruments (e.g. the Work Preference 
Inventory (WPI) developed by Amabile et al., 1994) had to be adjusted to capture the 
hedonic–normative distinction and the organizational level of analysis, and to take 
account of the buyout setting
3.  In the survey, the responding member of the top 
                                                 
2 The author would like to thank the research partners for providing access to this information. 
3 Exploratory interviews with top managers of buyout companies indicated that it would not be practical 
to obtain responses to a survey that measures the entire WPI instrument twice (prior to the buyout and 
today).  Hence the most relevant items of the WPI for our purposes were identified with the interviewees, 
adjusted to the context of our study and integrated in the questionnaire. 
9 management team was asked to assess the motivational levels of his or her management 
team prior to the buyout and at the time of the survey.  This one-respondent research 
design was the only practical way of collecting data on a sufficiently large cross-
sectional sample of buyouts, as the requirement to have multiple respondents per 
company would have reduced the response rate to levels that make any statistical 
analysis of the data impossible.  The response was given on a 5-point fully anchored 
Likert scale ranging from “-2” (False) to “+2” (True) through the following two 
questions: (1) “In the period prior to the buyout, to what extent would you say that the 
following statements were true (on average) for the other members of your management 
team?” and, (2) “Looking at the situation today, to what extent would you say the 
following statements are true (on average) for the other members of your management 
team?” Following these two introductory questions, the eight statements, described in 
the following in more detail, were evaluated twice to assess hedonic, normative and 
extrinsic interest alignment.  The difference in scores on each of these questions 
between the present and the time prior to the buyout were taken as measures of the 
change in indicators of interest alignment.  
Hedonic Interest Alignment (HIA) was measured using the two following 
statements: “They feel/felt satisfied by their job” and “They enjoy(ed) what they 
are/were doing”.  These items capture the essence of the hedonic frame of (Lindenberg 
(2001)) underlying hedonic interest alignment, according to which a task is performed 
for its own sake, as the activity is perceived as enjoyable and leads to satisfaction.  
Normative Interest Alignment (NIA) was measured using four items, 
corresponding to the statements: (1) “They really feel/felt as if this company’s problems 
are/were their own”; (2)  “This company has/had a great deal of personal meaning for 
them”; (3) Their behavior is/was guided by norms and values of the company”; and, (4) 
“They take/took pride in the success of their company”.  Again, these items have been 
developed to capture the nature of the normative frame (Lindenberg  (2001)) that 
underlies normative interest alignment.  
Extrinsic Interest Alignment (EIA) was assessed using two items that capture 
extrinsic motivation, based on the goal of obtaining additional resources (Brief and 
Aldag (1977)) in either tangible or intangible form through the statements: (1) “Their 
behavior is/was guided by a desire to maximize shareholder value”; and (2) “Their 
behavior was guided by a desire for professional success”.  
 
10 3.4 Controls  
The 19 control variables consisted of dummies for the nine industry categories, 
the returns to the FTSE 100 stock market index during the time between the entry of the 
buyout and either the exit or the date of the survey response (“Mkt Return”), the debt-
to-equity ratio in the first annual report after the buyout (“LEV1A”), the size of the deal 
measured as the natural logarithm of the amount of equity invested (“sizeln”), a dummy 
indicating whether the deal was exited or not (“X_NO”), an indicator of the degree of 
involvement of the equity investor in the management of the company measured on a 5-
point fully anchored Likert scale ranging from “-2” (Hands-Off) to “+2” (Deeply 
involved) (“GP_INVOL”) and five dummy variables that indicated whether events that 
change the resource base of the company occurred after the buyout or not: 
“REORGAO” for strategic reorganization; “LAYOFFO” for layoffs; “RESTRUCO” for 
organizational restructuring; “DIVESTO” for divestitures of Divestitures of individual 
sub-units and “ACQUIO” for Acquisition programmes.  
This study’s aim is to assess the effect of changes in different components of 
interest alignment on firm performance, controlling for other factors that may influence 
actual or potential performance. The statistical method chosen has been ordinary least-
squares (OLS) multivariate regression. The model used to test our arguments is 
specified as follows: (See also Figure 2). 
Firm Performance  =  α0 + β1 Change in Extrinsic Interest Alignment + β2 Change 
in Normative Interest Alignment + β3  Change in Hedonic 






4   Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used on the model are reported in Table 2.  
The results indicate that the average IRR of the 69 responses for which quantitative 
performance information has been available is 23%.  It should also be acknowledged 
that on average, buyouts increased all three types of interest alignment, as the average 
11 score on all eight items was highly positive. The bivariate correlation analysis 
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient) of the main variables in our model (Table 3) provides 
some initial evidence that there is indeed a statistically significant relationship between 
changes in interest alignment and performance.  One finds a significant and positive 
relationship between performance and (a) changes in hedonic (p<.05) and (b) changes in 
extrinsic interest alignment (p<.1). Interestingly, the three constructs for changes in 
hedonic, normative and extrinsic interest alignment correlate positively with one 
another (all three p<.05). This finding contradicts arguments that an increase in extrinsic 
motivation “crowds-out” intrinsic types of motivation and will have to be discussed 
later.  
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 4 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses.  Model 0 
constitutes the base-line specifications consisting of the control variables only, Model 1 
adds the three explanatory variables for changes in extrinsic, normative and hedonic 
interest alignment (EIA, NIA and HIA). An interesting picture evolves from the results 
of our analysis of the hypothesized relationships. First, it is important to note that the 
three components of interest alignment significantly add to the explanatory power of the 
model (Adjusted R² increases from 13,6% in Model 0 to 22,2% in Model 1; F-Test of 
the increase in R² indicates significance at the 0,05 level). This supports the view that 
interest alignment does play an important role in determining firm performance. 
Second, we can take a look at our Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, predicting a positive 
relationship between changes in each of the three sub-components (extrinsic, normative 
and hedonic) of interest alignment and performance.  The analysis fails to provide 
support for the direct positive performance impact of both extrinsic and normative 
interest alignment, as stated in H1 and H2.  This is particularly striking, as enhanced 
extrinsic motivation was one of the most prominent factors for value creation in buyouts 
according to the received literature (e.g. Kaplan (1989); Singh (1990)).  With respect to 
changes in hedonic interest alignment, however, our results indicate a strongly positive 
and significant (p<0.05) impact on performance, in line with H3.  This suggests that 
buyout success depends on how much the buyout contributes to greater overall job 
satisfaction of the managers of the target company.   
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
12 As a robustness check, a test for inverted causality between performance and 
changes in interest alignment was carried out.  In other words, an assessment was made 
whether the link between performance and changes in interest alignment is indeed 
causal, as specified in the theoretical model, i.e. changes in interest alignment causing 
changes in performance.  This is especially important, as from a theoretical standpoint 
the opposite relationship (higher performance leading to increased interest alignment) is 
also plausible.  This is especially true in the case of hedonic interest alignment, which is 
driven by job satisfaction and thus intuitively linked to success.  With the available 
cross-sectional data, the best possible way of gaining insight into the causal direction of 
this relationship was to first run a model in which one component of interest alignment 
was the dependent variable, explained by controls and hypothesized antecedents 
(Gottschalg and Zollo (2004)), and then to add performance as an additional 
explanatory variable in a second stage of the nested models.  The results of the three 
models with change in extrinsic, normative and hedonic interest alignment as dependent 
variables indicate that performance does indeed have a positive impact on hedonic 
interest alignment beyond the effect of its hypothesized antecedents.  However, the 
influence of hedonic interest alignment on measures of performance was of greater 
magnitude and of higher statistical significance than the influence of performance on 
interest alignment in the alternative specifications.  These results give us confidence in 
the hypothesized causal impact of interest alignment on performance, even though one 
cannot fully exclude the possibility of inverse causality with the available data. Only a 
longitudinal research design could shed additional light on this question and would be 
an interesting focus for future research efforts. As an additional robustness check we ran 
model with only one of the three explanatory variables at a time, rather than adding all 
three collectively. The results were not qualitatively different from those in Model 1. 
Also in the separate setting, only changes in hedonic interest alignment were 
significantly related to performance. Finally, we checked the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for all of the variables for the estimated models. The maximum value of 3.3 is 
substantially below the rule of thumb cutoff of 10 used to indicate multicollinearity 
problems. 
 
5   Discussion and Conclusion 
 
It was the objective of this study to empirically test some of the fundamental 
13 tenants of interest alignment theory as proposed by Gottschalg & Zollo (2004). On the 
most aggregate level, the results confirm the existence of an overall positive relationship 
between organizational interest alignment and firm performance. This supports the view 
that increased interest alignment can indeed serve as a tool to boost performance based 
on a better realization of a firm’s potential performance as determined by assets, 
capabilities and market positions (Figure 1) (Gottschalg & Zollo, 2004).  
Second, our analysis also provides detailed insight into the motivational 
mechanisms that underlie interest alignment.  The evidence provided suggests that we 
may have to revise some of our prior convictions as to how interest alignment works. 
Based on existing theory, we expected a positive impact of all three components of 
interest alignment on organizational performance. However, our results point to hedonic 
interest alignment as the only significant performance determinant among the three.  
This suggests that the phenomenon of “loving” one's job that Amabile (Amabile (1997); 
Amabile  (2000)) described as the driving force behind outstanding performance on 
specific tasks (creativity-related jobs, academia) may also be present at the 
organizational level.  It seems as if the perception of a work environment as self-
determined, competence enhancing (Deci and Ryan (1985)) works as an important 
determinant of firm performance.  At the same time it is surprising, that extrinsic 
interest alignment, based on the motivation to work for tangible or intangible rewards, 
has no significant direct impact on performance. This is even more striking given that 
our empirical context, leveraged buyouts, have been frequently portrayed as archetypes 
for value creation based on enhanced extrinsic motivation (Kaplan  (1989)). More 
generally, this finding calls into question a variety of measures commonly undertaken to 
influence behaviour through extrinsic motivation, such as monitoring and control 
regimes. 
  Finally, our findings shed light on the interaction effects between the different 
components of interest alignment. What we find is that on the organizational level 
different types of motivation seem to be mutually reinforcing in their influence on 
performance (Table 3). This is in disagreement with the conclusions of three decades of 
research and social psychology (Deci and Koestner (1999); Deci and Koestner (1999)), 
as we do not see any evidence of a possible “over justification effect”, i.e. a negative 
impact of an increase in extrinsic interest alignment on other types of interest alignment.  
This could be explained either by the fact that several types of motivational mechanisms 
can coexist on the organizational level, (while on an individual level one crowds out the 
14 other), or that the individual preferences (of top managers) and task characteristics in 
the managerial context differ so radically from the typical experimental design of 
studies documenting the over justification effect (in psychology, pre-school children 
drawing pictures) that findings from the latter cannot be generalized to the former. 
Having said this, it is important to also keep in mind that the results should be 
interpreted with care, since there are important limitations inherent in the design of our 
study that need to be considered before the findings can be generalized.  First, the 
chosen empirical setting implies a number of particularities regarding antecedents and 
consequences of interest alignment.  It is possible that some of our findings are 
idiosyncratic to the buyout situation.  Second, the nature of the private equity industry 
with its tendency towards secrecy made survey-based data collection difficult and led to 
a relatively low response rate.  In addition, the chosen one-respondent research design 
to assess aggregate managerial motivation is somewhat imperfect, as ideally motivation 
should be measured through multiple respondents.  Finally, the study tests novel theory 
using novel measures and thus did not have the luxury of well-established and validated 
instruments in measuring the key constructs. 
Future research in this area should verify whether and under what conditions the 
findings presented here can be observed in different empirical settings.  It would be 
particularly interesting to conduct a longitudinal analysis to gain additional insight into 
the directionality of the performance-interest alignment relationship, and to gather data 
from multiple respondents across multiple hierarchical layers within one large 
organization to verify how individual motivation aggregates to organizational interest 
alignment.  This would also allow us to better understand motivational “cascading 
effects”, i.e. whether interest alignment on one hierarchical level is influenced by, or 
influences interest alignment on another hierarchical level. 
Overall, the results of our analyses point to the need to consider more explicitly 
the role of motivational mechanisms in our theories.  The important impact of 
motivation at the organizational level has been increasingly recognized in the 
management discourse (Makadok  (2003);  Coff  (1997);  Coff  (1999);  Castanias and 
Helfat (1991); Gottschalg and Zollo (2004)).  It is now time to further open up the 
motivation black-box.  This can only be achieved if we incorporate motivation in 
theories in a way that does justice to the multi-dimensional and interrelated nature of the 
construct. The development of a comprehensive theory of firm performance and 
competitive advantage requires a detailed understanding of how motivation works at the 
15 organizational level that can only be gained through an integration of existing 
motivation theories in both social psychology and economics.  While the analysis 
presented in this paper can be but a first step towards this goal, it may open up the door 
to a rich and fruitful area for future inquiry. 



























   Position 
A firm’s assets and capabilities and its competitive position only determine potential 
firm performance.  Employee motivation through Interest Alignment has a crucial 
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and Values to the 
individual 
Source: Gottschalg & Zollo (2004) 
18 TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
IRR  -      0,5            1,0          0,23               0,38   
NIA  -      5,0          16,0          6,86               4,10   
HIA  -      4,0            8,0          3,61               2,69   
EIA  -      3,0            6,0          1,70               1,54   
LEASING          -              1,0          0,14               0,30   
OTHMANUF          -              1,0          0,10               0,26   
MECHANIC          -              1,0          0,05               0,17   
WHOLESAL          -              1,0          0,02               0,12   
PRINTING          -              1,0          0,09               0,26   
ELECTRIC          -              1,0          0,09               0,26   
RETAIL          -              1,0          0,02               0,12   
BANKING          -              1,0          0,04               0,17   
SOFTWARE          -              1,0          0,02               0,12   
Mkt Return  -8,6%  23,1% -1,0%            0,05   
LEV1A  -      1,0          73,9        10,15               9,17   
X_NO          -              1,0          0,69               0,41   
Sizeln          -              6,2          2,65               1,40   
REORGAO          -              1,0          0,52               0,50   
LAYOFFO          -              1,0          0,28               0,45   
GP_RELAT  -      2,0            2,0          0,57               1,04   
RESTRUCO          -              1,0          0,62               0,49   
DIVESTO          -              1,0          0,19               0,39   
ACQUIO          -              1,0          0,30               0,46   
N=69 
 
TABLE  3: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS (PEARSON) 
 
   IRR  NIA  HIA 
NIA              0,16          
HIA              0,31   *            0,73   **    
EIA              0,21   +            0,32   **            0,26   * 
+  significant at the 0,1 level (2-tailed). 
*  significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed). 
**  significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). 
N=69      
 
19 TABLE  4: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Model 0  1 
  Std. Beta  Std. Beta 
Industry Dummies  Yes   Yes 
Mkt Return  0,26 +  0,22 
LEV1A -0,13  -0,15 
X_NO -0,04  -0,11 
Sizeln -0,04  -0,07 
GP_INVOL 0,04  0,02 
REORGAO 0,01  -0,12 
LAYOFFO -0,09  -0,05 
RESTRUCO -0,05  -0,05 
DIVESTO 0,12  0,13 
ACQUIO -0,05  -0,07 
EIA   0,20 
NIA   -0,29 
HIA   0,43 * 
Model Sig  N/S  0,05 
R² 0,377  0,474 
Adj. R²  0,136  0,222 
Sig. F Change  N/A  0,05 
* significant at the 0.05 level  
.+ significant at the 0.1 level . 





Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972). “Production, information costs, and 
economic organization.” American Economic Review 62: 777-795. 
Allen, Natalie J. and John P Meyer (1990). “The Measurement and Antecedents of 
Affective, Continuance and Normative Commitment to the Organization.” 
Journal of Occupational Psychology 63: 1-18. 
Amabile, Teresa M. (1997). “Motivating creativity in organizations: On doing what you 
love and loving what you do.” California Management Review 40(1): 39. 
Amabile, Teresa M. (2000). “Stimulate Creativity by Fueling Passion.” Blackwell 
Handbook of Principles of Organizational Behavior: 331. 
Amabile, Teresa M., Elizabeth M. Tighe, et al. (1994). “The Work Preference 
Inventory: Assessing Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivational Orientations.” Journal 
of Personality & Social Psychology 66(5): 950. 
Anders, George (1992). “The 'Barbarians' in the Boardroom.” Harvard Business Review 
70(4): 79. 
Baker, George. P. and Cynthia A. Montgomery (1994). Conglomerates and LBO 
associations: A comparison of organisational forms, Harvard Business School. 
Barney, Jay B. (1986). “Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business 
strategy.” Management Science 32(10): 1231-1241. 
Barney, Jay B. (1991). “Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.” Journal 
of Management 17(1): 99-120. 
Berg, Achim and Oliver Gottschalg (2005). “Understanding Value Generation in 
Buyouts.” Journal of Restructuring Finance 2(1). 
Brief, Arthur P. and Ramon J. Aldag (1977). “The Intrinsic-Extrinsic Dichotomy: 
Toward Conceptual Clarity.” Academy of Management Review 2(3): 496. 
Castanias, R P and C E Helfat (1991). “Managerial Resources and Rents.” Journal of 
Management 17: 155-171. 
Coff, Russell W. (1997). “Human assets and management dilemmas: Coping with 
hazards on the road to resource-based theory.” Academy of Management Review 
22(2): 374. 
Coff, Russell W. (1999). “When Competitive Advantage Doesn't Lead to Performance: 
The Resource-Based View and Stakeholder Bargaining Power.” Organization 
Science: A Journal of the Institute of Management Sciences 10(2): 119. 
Cotter, James F. and Sarah W. Peck (2001). “The structure of debt and active equity 
investors: The case of the buyout specialist.” Journal of Financial Economics 
59(1): 101. 
Deci, Edward L. (1975). Intrinsic motivation. New York and London, Plenum Press. 
Deci, Edward L. (1976). “The Hidden Costs of Rewards.” Organizational Dynamics 
4(3): 61. 
Deci, Edward L. and Richard Koestner (1999). “A meta-analytic review of experiments 
examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic.” Psychological Bulletin 
125(6): 627. 
Deci, Edward L. and Richard Koestner (1999). “The undermining effect is a reality after 
all--extrinsic rewards, task interest, and.” Psychological Bulletin 125(6): 692. 
Deci, Edward L. and Richard M. Ryan (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-
determination in human behavior. New York, Plenum Press. 
Eisenberger, Robert and Judy Cameron (1996). “Detrimental effects of reward.” 
21 American Psychologist 51(11): 1153. 
Eisenberger, Robert and Judy Cameron (1998). “Reward, intrinsic interest, and 
creativity: New findings.” American Psychologist 53(6): 676. 
Eisenberger, Robert and Judy Cameron (1999). “Does Pay for Performance Increase or 
Decrease Perceived Self-Determination and Intrinsic Motivation?” Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology 77(5): 1026. 
Fox, Isaac and Alfred Marcus (1992). “The Causes and Consequences of Leveraged 
Management Buyouts.” Academy of Management Review 17(1): 62. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Reto Jegen (2001). “Motivation Crowding Theory.” Journal of 
Economic Surveys 15(5): 589. 
Gottschalg, Oliver, Nicolaus Loos, et al. (2004). “Creating Value in Private Equity.” 
European Venture Capital Journal June(113). 
Gottschalg, Oliver, Ludovic Phalippou, et al. (2004). “The performance of private 
equity funds - another puzzle?” INSEAD Working Paper. 
Gottschalg, Oliver and Maurizio Zollo (2004). “Interest Aligment and Competitive 
Advantage.” INSEAD Working Paper. 
Hackman, J.R., G. Oldham, et al. (1975). “A New Strategy for Job Enrichment.” 
California Management Review 17. 
Hackman, J.R. and G.R. Oldham (1976). “Motivation through the design of work.” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 16: 250-279. 
Hackman, R.  and C.J. Gersick (1990). “Habitual Routines in Task Performing Groups.” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 47: 65-97. 
Jensen, M. C. (1989). “Eclipse of the public corporation.” Harvard Business Review 
67(5): 61. 
Jensen, Michael C. (1986). “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and 
takeovers.” American Economic Review 76: 323-329. 
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 3(305-360). 
Kaplan, Steven (1989). “The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating 
Performance and Value.” Journal of Financial Economics 24(2): 217-254. 
King, William, Jacob Hautaluoma, et al. (1983). “Intrinsic motivation, the meaning of 
pay, and work quality and quantity.” Journal of Social Psychology 116(1): 147-
148. 
Kreps, David M. (1997). “Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives.” American 
Economic Review 87(2): 359-364. 
Lindenberg, Siegwart (2001). “Intrinsic Motivation in a New Light.” Kyklos 54(2/3). 
Makadok, Richard (2003). “Doing the Right Thing and Knowing the Right Thing to Do: 
Why the Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts.” Strategic Management 
Journal 24(10): 1043. 
Penrose, Edith T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Peteraf, Margaret A. (1993). “The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-
based view.” Strategic Management Journal 14: 179-191. 
Porter, Michael E. (1979). “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy.” Harvard 
Business Review(March-April). 
Porter, Michael E. (1980). Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries 
and Competition. New York, The Free Press. 
Porter, Michael E. (1985). Competitive Advantage. New York, The Free Press. 
Prendergast, Canice (1999). “The Provision of Incentives in Firms.” Journal of 
22 Economic Literature 37(1): 7. 
Schuler, R S and Susan E. Jackson (1987). “Linking Competitive Strategies with 
Human Resource Management Practices.” Academy of Management Executive 
1(3): 207-219. 
Schuler, R S and Ian C. MacMillan (1984). “Gaining Competitive Advantage Through 
Human Resource Management Practices.” Human Resource Management 23: 
241-255. 
Singh, Harbir (1990). “Management Buyouts: Distinguishing Characteristics and 
Operating Changes Prior to Public Offering.” Strategic Management Journal 
11(4): 111. 
Smith, Abbie J. (1990). “Corporate Ownership structure and performance.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 27: 143-164. 
Steers, Richard M. and Richard T. Mowday (1977). “The Motivational Properties of 
Tasks.” Academy of Management Review 2(4): 645. 
Wernerfelt, Birger (1984). “A resource-based view of the firm.” Strategic Management 
Journal 14: 4-12. 
23 